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The Eastern Indonesia Region Transport Project: An Introduction 
 
The Eastern Indonesia Region Transport Project (EIRTP-I), funded by the World Bank from 
2001-2006, supports efforts to stimulate economic growth and improve social welfare in the 15 
provinces and about 130 kabupaten (districts) and kotamadya (municipalities) of Eastern 
Indonesia through improving access to road transport facilities, reducing road transport costs, 
and facilitating efficient use of resources.  EIRTP-I, which is the subject of this case study, is the 
first of two complementary and closely related transport projects.  This project focuses on the 
preservation and development of national and other strategic road assets.  It has three distinct 
components: the improvement of the condition of national and other strategic arterial roads; 
facilitation of an effective and sustainable decentralization of planning and management  
responsibilities for works on all primary roads (national, provincial and kabupaten) to the 
provincial and kabupaten governments; and increasing the efficiency, quality and transparency 
in awarding works, thereby improving the use of scarce financial and natural resources.  
US$200 million were committed by the World Bank to this project, which is carried out by the 
Directorate General of Regional Infrastructure (DGRI) within the Indonesian Ministry of 
Settlement and Regional Infrastructure (MSRI).  The Directorate of Technical Affairs (BINTEK) 
in the DGRI is the lead implementing agency and executes the project through a Project 
Management Unit (PMU).  The regional agencies (provinces) implement the project in the 
regions in accordance with the Government of Indonesia’s (GoI) regulations on 
decentralization. 
 
The World Bank’s transport projects have been challenged by severe problems related to 
corruption, collusion and nepotism (KKN) in the past.  However, this is a sector in which the 
World Bank will invest heavily in the future both in Indonesia and worldwide.1  As more funds 
                                                     
1 Please, see Paul Wolfowitz, “Annual Meeting Address,” Washington, DC, September 24, 2005.  
Available from 
will be dedicated to transport projects in Indonesia by the World Bank, an increased focus on 
anti-corruption measures and monitoring efforts in transport projects is likely in the future.2 
Furthermore, in the context of Indonesia’s massive decentralization and its impacts on 
infrastructure projects due to the mushrooming of new local regulations (perda, or peraturan 
daerah) in the form of taxes and levies, power struggles between different government layers, 
legal uncertainties and the emergence of new interest groups on the ground, corruption-related 
risks are on the rise.3  Implemented at the provincial level, EIRTP-I has been exposed to the 
repercussions of the Indonesian decentralization process.4  An examination of EIRTP-I thus 
provides useful insights for other projects that will be implemented at the provincial or district 
level.  Against this backdrop, EIRTP-I is an interesting case study of current measures to 
prevent and monitor KKN in World Bank transport projects and its analysis will point to 
possibilities for improvement of anti-corruption measures for future transport projects.  
 
Situation Analysis5 
 
The Project Appraisal Document (PAD) outlines several measures to monitor corruption in 
EIRTP-I.  There were two main fields of concern: one, to prevent and detect corruption during 
the procurement process of the project, and two, to forestall and identify corruption during the 
implementation phase of the project.  The following section will outline the corruption-related 
problems EIRTP-I has faced during both the procurement process and the implementation 
phase, the measures that have been taken against these risks and finally which of these 
measures have been considered as useful by the people involved in the project.  
 
The Procurement Phase of EIRTP-I 
 
The most prominent corruption-related risks during the procurement phase of EIRTP-I have 
been collusion amongst bidders, coercion exerted by some bidders over others, and price 
inflation.  Indications for such risks have been the proximity of the proposed costs to the bid 
                                                                                                                                                                           
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,,contentMDK:20659654~menuPK:34472~pa
gePK:34370~piPK:34424~theSitePK:4607,00.html  [Accessed: October 5, 2005]. 
2 Interview with Steve Burgess, Senior Social Development Specialist, and Rizal Rivai, Senior 
Procurement Specialist, World Bank Office Jakarta (WBOJ), September 12, 2005. 
3 Please see Hidayat S. and H. Antlöv, “Decentralization and Regional Autonomy in Indonesia,” In 
Decentralization, Democratic Governance, and Civil Society in Comparative Perspective: Africa, Asia, and Latin 
America, edited by P. Oxhorn, J.T. Tulchin and A.D. Seele. Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center 
Press, 2004, 279. See also F. Fitrani, B. Hofman, and K. Kaiser, “Unity in Diversity? The Creation of New 
Local Governments in a Decentralising Indonesia,” Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, 41 (1) 2005: 57-
79. 
4 The second generation of the EIRTP project, EIRTP-II, which is implemented at the district level, is even 
more exposed to the challenges of decentralization.  
5 This situation analysis is based on information derived from interviews with the Task Team Leader 
(TTL) of this project, Robert Scouller, Senior Infrastructure Engineer, WBOJ, September 13, 2005 and 
September 25, 2005; an interview with Susan Wong, WBOJ,  September 20, 2005; an interview with Team 
Leader of Project Management Core Consultant Team (CTC) , Roger Gould, Jakarta, October 5, 2005 as 
well as a review of project-related documents such as the project appraisal document (PAD), financial 
management documents and others. 
estimate,6 the proximity of the project costs across bidders, or incidences in which the same 
bidder won repeatedly.  Further indicators for KKN in EIRTP-I that have been named were 
bidding documents that contained rounded numbers, bidding processes with an unusually 
small number of bidders, large differences in the quality of bidding documents, or withdrawals 
of bidders at the last minute.    
 
The PAD numbers various measures to prevent the aforementioned risks during the 
procurement phase.  Amongst others, regional kick-off workshops at the beginning of the 
project were planned to confirm the requirements of the Bank and to formally introduce the 
latest Bank procurement documents.  Furthermore, training programs and certification 
processes for all bid and procurement committees were planned.  Besides this, a procurement 
specialist was to be assigned for one year to the Regional Consultancy Teams, which were 
supposed to liaise with the Procurement Unit at the World Bank Office Jakarta (WBOJ).  
Additionally, an annex included in the PAD outlined measures for increased disclosure of 
project information to ensure compliance with procurement procedures, a reduction of 
procurement delays, and the improvement of the monitoring procedure.7   
 
Various anti-corruption measures were implemented during EIRTP-I.  When the project was 
started, the regulations required a pre-qualification of bidders in the procurement process. 
These stipulations were more detailed than in past transport projects.8  However, pre-
qualification of bidders still allowed collusion of such a scale that this procedure was changed 
during the running of EIRTP-I to post-qualification of bidders.  Post-qualification of bidders 
allowed a more careful examination of the bidders by the WBOJ.  Furthermore, regional 
workshops and training sessions were organized for bid and procurement committees as 
outlined in the PAD.9  Notwithstanding, during these trainings, which usually lasted two-to-
three days, no technical certification was obtained;  all participants acquired certificates of 
attendance only.10  
 
According to the Senior Project Engineer, there were no obstacles in getting most of the 
information that is considered to be vital for a thorough procurement review, although the tight 
project timeframe often made a careful review of the extensive procurement documents 
challenging.  However, more specific data on companies that are bidding for a tender or which 
are otherwise involved in the procurement process would be welcome in future projects.  
Increased co-operation with bodies such as the Indonesian Chamber of Commerce (KADIN) has 
been mentioned as a possible means to obtain such information.  Besides procurement reviews, 
the exchange of information with non-governmental organizations (NGOs), the questioning of 
                                                     
6 Please see E. Hafild, “Corruption Monitoring in the Bali Urban Infrastructure Project.” In Sea-Change 
Partners, ”Monitoring Corruption in World Bank Projects: An Organizational Learning Approach,“ 
September 2004, 53-60. 
7 Please see Project Appraisal Document, November 12, 2001, 24-27, 113-114.  Henceforth, PAD. 
8 The Sumatra Region Road Project (SRRP) started earlier than the EIRTP-I.  However, it was delayed due 
to the financial crisis and subsequently ran concurrently with the EIRTP-I.  Not many lessons from the 
SSRP could thus be incorporated in the EIRTP-I PAD.  
9 These procurement committees were appointed within each province by the Dinas (office) for the 
discipline. In the case of EIRTP-I Dinas Bina Marga appointed staff from within the provincial Dinas. E-
mail communication with Senior Project Engineer, November 1, 2005. 
10 This approach was not changed in the EIRTP-II.  
corruptors as well as special commissioned studies have been identified by the Senior Project 
Engineer as the most effective means to identify potential corruption vulnerabilities and 
problem cases during the procurement process.  Mid-term evaluations of projects and financial 
management reports were deemed to be less helpful since they did not reveal any corruption-
related incidents during the running of the project. 
The Implementation Phase of EIRTP-I 
 
Various corruption-related risks were identified during the implementation phase of EIRTP-I.  
Reversed mark-ups, i.e. once budgets were agreed, cheaper material than proposed was used; 
experts obtaining kick-backs for benevolent feasibility studies; as well as the 10-15% of project 
funds that were spent on kick-backs to government officials are the major corruption-related 
problems this project has faced.  By far the biggest challenge, however, was the under-usage of 
material during EIRTP-I construction.  Either wrong material was used or existing material was 
stretched.11  In the past, transport projects have been rated unsatisfactory because of this 
problem. 
 
The PAD, again, outlines various measures to contain the aforementioned problems during the 
implementation phase.12 Amongst others, the GoI was expected to establish a Steering 
Committee to facilitate coordination among ministries and departments as well as among local 
governments.  The PMU was charged with monitoring progress in project implementation, and 
employees of these and other agencies involved in the implementation of this project were 
expected to follow a published code of ethics.  The PAD further outlined complaints 
mechanisms for incidences of bribery and mentioned the possibility of reporting bribery to the 
official mailbox of the Vice President of the GoI.  In the PAD, the Bank’s Department of 
Institutional Integrity Investigation Unit (INTIU) was also given a role in investigating cases as 
considered necessary, although normally all cases of fraudulent and corrupt practices are 
supposed to be investigated by the GoI.  During EIRTP-I, supervision of the implementation 
phase of a project was carried out by an independent consulting group.  
 
According to the Senior Project Engineer, good supervision would be needed to tackle the 
aforementioned problems during the implementation phase of a transport project.  However, 
during EIRTP-I and until the present, there is no systematic procedure in place to measure and 
track such corruption-related problems.  Should incidents of corruption be detected during a 
financial audit of the EIRTP-I, the World Bank can defer or hold-up payments for a project.  
Financial audits were thus seen as a moderately useful instrument to detect and follow-up 
corruption cases in the EIRTP-I.  During EIRTP-I, the World Bank repeatedly cancelled bids and 
re-bid packages.  However, there was no blacklisting of corrupt contractors as a result of 
financial audits and few, if any, contracts were cancelled entirely. 
 
Technical audits, on the other side, were seen as less useful.  Although they might theoretically 
detect KKN in the project, World Bank staff cannot follow up on complaints deriving from these 
audits but can only report such accounts of corruption to the GoI.  According to the Senior 
Project Engineer, the actions taken by the GoI to follow up complaints about corruption during 
EIRTP-I were erratic at best.  With regard to the other anti-corruption measures outlined above, 
already the PAD was sceptical about their potential effectiveness.  With regard to the code of 
ethics people involved in the project had to adhere to, the PAD criticized that as not “detailed 
enough to clarify all situations and answer all questions.”  The PAD further raised that the 
                                                     
11 An emblematic example for the latter problem was given by the TTL who mentioned several cases 
where road-posts were put into the ground every two kilometers whereas the budget foresaw road-posts 
every kilometer.  
12 Please see PAD, 13-17, 24-27. 
complaint database of the Vice President of the GoI is not properly maintained, nor are follow-
up actions consistently taken.13   
 
These doubts were shared by the Senior Project Engineer, who pointed out that the results of 
the investigations led by the World Bank’s INTIU were not available for public disclosure for a 
long time after the investigation.  According to the Senior Project Engineer, the INTIU would 
need over two years to conduct a serious investigation and follow up on corruption-related 
complaints.  This is too long for a project like EIRTP-I, the lifespan of which is only five years.  
 
Assessment 
 
The following section will briefly assess the anti-corruption efforts undertaken during the 
procurement and implementation phase of EIRTP-I and present an evaluation of the follow-up 
mechanisms for corruption complaints in that project.   
                                                     
13 Please see PAD, 26.  
The Procurement Phase of the EIRTP-I  
 
There seems to have been a solid understanding of the possible risks in the procurement phase 
of EIRTP-I.  Indicators of KKN during the procurement phase were straightforward, people in 
the project were aware of them, and actions to prevent such incidents were put in place from 
the beginning or were adopted during the running of the project, as outlined above. Especially 
the change from pre-qualification of bidders to post-qualification of bidders seems to have 
resulted in very positive changes, such as an increase in numbers of potential bidders or 
reductions of project costs.  Despite these precautions, the project still faced moderate-to-serious 
corruption problems during the procurement phase, according to the Senior Project Engineer’s 
own evaluation.  Although the absolute number of KKN-related incidents during procurement 
processes could be contained at a moderate level, the size of single incidents was sometimes of 
an enormous scale.14  Other incidents included the tacit change of the conditions defined in the 
procurement document, e.g. the price for building material that was put down in the 
procurement document was increased later by the contracted companies. 
 
The Implementation Phase of the EIRTP-I  
 
Indicators of corruption during the implementation phase of EIRTP-I were less straightforward 
than during the procurement phase.  This is probably part of the reason why monitoring of 
corruption-related risks during the implementation phase of the project was less distinct. 
However, World Bank staff affiliated with EIRTP-I seemed to have a thorough understanding of 
the corruption-related risks this project faced during the implementation phase and how such 
problems could be prevented.  Yet, compared to the anti-corruption efforts that were taken 
during the procurement phase of EIRTP-I, the anti-corruption monitoring during the 
implementation phase were insufficient.  There was no system in place that would allow 
measurement and tracking of corruption during the implementation phase systematically.  
Furthermore, the monitoring carried out by an independent consulting group was considered 
insufficient by the Senior Project Engineer.  Furthermore, the scale of foreign supervision in 
EIRTP-I was considered to be far too small.  Such problems were further exacerbated by the fact 
that the amount of funds allocated for supervision of this project was only a fraction of what 
private sector companies would spend for projects of similar size.15  
  
Follow up 
 
A major shortcoming regarding anti-corruption efforts during both the procurement and 
implementation phase of EIRTP-I was the complete absence of a stringent and systematic 
complaints monitoring system throughout the entire project period.  In other words, there were 
                                                     
14 One case was mentioned during the interview with Robert Scouller  in which collusion in procurement 
increased project costs by US$2.5 million in one project.    
15 According to the interview with the Senior Project Engineer Robert Scouller on September 13, 2005, in 
EIRTP-I, approximately 3-5% of the project budget was spent for monitoring and supervision.  About 8% 
of the budget was spent for design reviews.  
no mechanisms in place that would have allowed both the people involved in the project as well 
as members of the community to express their concerns.  Although the PAD outlined several 
complaints mechanisms, the efficiency and effectiveness of these measures were already 
questioned in the PAD, as was shown above.  These doubts were confirmed during the 
interview with the Senior Project Engineer who assessed the mechanisms in place as “not 
useful.”16  Furthermore, the rigid information dissemination scheme that was planned to be set 
up in the PAD17 was never implemented.  Similarly, plans to work together with “experienced 
NGOs” in the evaluation of anti-corruption efforts and information dissemination as outlined in 
the PAD18 never materialized either.  
 
Project-specific Proposals 
 
Against the backdrop of the shortcomings outlined above, two suggestions are presented 
below.  The suggestions are divided into immediate actions and medium-term actions. 
Immediate actions are those which are largely within the World Bank’s control and can be 
undertaken in the short-term.  It would be desirable to see the medium-term actions 
implemented, but these are to some degree outside the World Bank’s control:19  
 
1) Existing monitoring and evaluation (M&E) systems have to be refined and adhered to.  The World 
Bank staff affiliated with EIRTP-I have a sound knowledge of the corruption-related risks that 
may occur during a transport project of this scale.  Various measures have already been 
developed to curb such risks, as shown above.  Against this backdrop, we thus argue that the 
biggest immediate potential for improving anti-corruption monitoring in EIRTP-I and similar 
future projects lies in the improvement and consolidation of existing M&E systems rather than 
trying to invent and establish new indicators to detect corruption-related risks.  Therefore, 
existing anti-corruption measures have to be refined and steps taken to assure that these 
measures will be adhered to.  
 
Procurement Phase 
 
a) Immediate Actions 
 
 The World Bank already has a Code of Conduct in place as outlined in the PAD20 
which requires bid and procurement committees to attend a workshop on the World 
Bank’s regulations on bidding procedures.  However, participating parties only have 
to obtain a certificate of attendance for these workshops in order to proceed to 
                                                     
16 Interview with Task Team Leader, September 13, 2005. 
17 Please see PAD, 111.  
18 Please see PAD, 102.  
19 For more general suggestions, see Transparency International, “Preventing Corruption on Construction 
Projects: Risk Assessment and Proposed Actions for Project Owners,” March 16, 2005.  [ONLINE] 
http://www.transparency.org [accessed September 30, 2005]. 
20 Please see PAD, 113-114. 
participate in the bids.  The World Bank should thus ensure that the participants of 
future workshops also have to obtain a technical certification from the World Bank. 
 
 During EIRTP-I, no civil society organizations were formally included in the 
supervision of the procurement process.  This was corrected in EIRTP-II to some 
extent with the introduction of the Community Representative Officers (CRO) 
scheme.  In each location where there is a road project from EIRTP-II, two CROs are 
supposed to monitor the project regarding incidents of KKN as well as to receive 
and handle complaints from the public.  So far, this CRO scheme is active in 37 
kabupaten (totaling almost 200 CROs) but is considered by the Senior Project 
Engineer far from being effective since it is still driven by ad hocism and subject to 
potential abuse both from bidders and the wider public. The fact that CRO members 
receive only reimbursed expenses rather than any remuneration for their efforts 
exacerbates further the potential for abuse of the CRO scheme.  Still, until now, the 
CROs were only involved in part of the bidding process, the bid opening.  The role 
of the CROs could theoretically be strengthened by involving the CROs in the bid-
analysis process.  At present, however, this is not a viable strategy as involvement of 
CROs in bid analysis is prohibited under GoI procurement legislation.  
 
 Contractual safeguards should be improved by the World Bank.  It is a requirement 
of all submissions with post-qualification to submit company information regularly 
with tender documents.  This information should be used more systematically. A 
database with company information could be established from this, which would 
facilitate a comparison with company information derived from KADIN.   
Furthermore, lists of past companies and individuals involved in procurement 
collusion could be established which would strengthen anti-corruption monitoring 
in transport projects. The ownership of such a database would have to lie within the 
WBOJ. 
 
b) Medium-term Actions 
 
 As was suggested by the Senior Project Engineer, more specific data on bidding 
companies are needed to tackle KKN during the procurement phase more efficiently.  
Increased cooperation between the World Bank and the Chamber of Commerce on 
both the national and district levels should be established to derive such data.  Such 
company-related information could then be pooled within the World Bank and 
made available to staff from other projects.    
 
 In the midterm and long run, the World Bank should only contract with companies 
that have implemented an internal anti-corruption code of conduct and management 
program.  To exert pressure on the companies to implement such anti-corruption 
codes of conduct, the World Bank should specify a date after which it will only work 
together with companies that have implemented such measures.  As there is the risk 
that certain companies will only pretend to have implemented such an anti-
corruption code of conduct but still engage in corrupt practices, this measure has to 
be accompanied by the introduction of an (international) externally audited ethical  
standard (ISO).  Companies would only be able to attain this standard if they 
implement an effective anti-corruption code of conduct.  After this standard has been 
introduced, the World Bank will only contract with companies that have qualified 
for this standard for projects above a certain size.  Such requirements could be 
introduced under the umbrella of the existing integrity pact between contractors and 
the World Bank.21   
 
Implementation phase 
 
a) Immediate Actions 
 
 The Senior Project Engineer felt that designs are required that are completely 
ready for implementation.  The World Bank should thus consider revising its 
project design review procedures and make the appropriate changes. 
 
 It seems that the shortcomings in the design review process are an expression of 
a more fundamental need for supervision.  Currently, the number of audits 
conducted is considered to be too small and their effectiveness to be hampered 
by factors outside the World Bank’s influence.  The World Bank, for example, 
cannot follow up cases of malfeasance in transport projects detected by technical 
audits but has to report such incidents to the GoI, which seems to process such 
cases in an errant manner, according to our various interviewees.  Against the 
backdrop of recent studies on corruption in transport projects in Indonesia which 
have confirmed the importance of audits and top-down control to deter 
corruption activities22 the number of independent and transparent audits should 
be increased.   
 
 Furthermore, during our analysis of EIRTP-I, we learned that the amount of 
foreign supervision in World Bank transport projects was considered inadequate.  
Given the positive impact foreign supervision in past transport projects has 
                                                     
21 For an example of such an integrity pact, see Transparency International, “Preventing Corruption on 
Construction Projects: Construction Integrity Pacts,” March 16, 2005 [ONLINE] 
http://www.transparency.org [accessed September 30, 2005].  
22 Please see B. Olken, “Monitoring Corruption: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Indonesia,” 2004 
[ONLINE] http://www.imf.org/external/np/res/seminars/2005/weak/bo.pdf [accessed October 7, 
2005]. 
had,23 the World Bank should support the appointment of more foreign 
independent assessors to monitor the execution of a project.24    
 
 For the implementation phase there seems to be ample space for both an 
improvement of the indicators of corruption as well as the systematization of the 
information derived from such indicators.  Additionally, EIRTP-I faced various 
corruption-related challenges that originated in the ongoing decentralization 
process of political institutions in Indonesia.  Overall, corruption-related risks 
have increased due to decentralization.  Current (EIRTP-II) as well as future 
infrastructure projects are likely to feel the repercussions of decentralization as 
well.  An improved corruption information system for the implementation phase 
would thus have to have the following characteristics: it needs indicators that 
allow estimation of the level of corruption, it has to be systematic, and it has to 
take the challenges of decentralization into account.  In other words, to provide 
the World Bank with the knowledge to implement efficient and effective anti-
corruption measures, more systematic information about regional differences 
regarding corruption is needed in the first place.  Past attempts to estimate 
corruption in Indonesia on both a national and sub-national level were largely 
based on “data” derived from perception-based surveys.25  Such surveys, 
however, are subject to a number of biases which make their explanatory power 
questionable.  One of the biggest weaknesses of perception-based indices is that 
they are only telling the reader something about how corruption is perceived, 
which can depend on factors that are unrelated to actual rent-seeking and 
                                                     
23 The Senior Project Engineer compared the Tol Ciari road that was built from Jakarta to Bogor in 1978, 
where there was intense foreign supervision during the implementation phase with the Ciawi-Cikampek 
road, which was a project of similar size, built a few years later without extensive foreign supervision.  
Despite intense traffic, only standard maintenance procedures have to be carried out for the Tol Ciawi 
road, whereas the Ciawi-Cikampek requires serious maintenance every couple of years.  
24 For a description of such a foreign assessor scheme, see Transparency International, “Preventing 
Corruption on Construction Projects: Independent Assessment,” March 16, 2005 [ONLINE] 
http://www.transparency.org [accessed September 30, 2005].  
25 Please see, for example, K. Kaiser, B. Hofman, and G. Schulze, “Dezentralisierung und Korruption – Erste 
Erfahrungen aus Indonesien,“ Vierteljahreshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung 2, 2004.; B. Brodjonegoro, ”The 
Effects of Decentralisation on Business in Indonesia, “ In Business in Indonesia: New Challenges, Old 
Problems, edited by M.C. Basri,  and P. van der Eng, Singapore: ISEAS Institute of Southeast Asian 
Studies, 2004;  G. Cremer, Schein-Consulting, Titelblattgeschäfte, Kick-Back-Auftragsforschung als Instrument 
der Mittelumlenkung. Beobachtungen zum Wissenschaftssektor in Indonesien, Internationales Asienforum 21 
(3/4), 2004, 209-234; P. Keefer, The Political Economy of Corruption in Indonesia Development Research Group 
DECRG, 2002, The World Bank, Available from 
www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/anticorrupt/FlagshipCourse2003/KeeferIndonesia.pdf. [accessed  
April 13, 2005]; A. Kuncoro, The New Laws of Decentralization and Corruption In Indonesia: Examination of 
Provincial and District Data Ideas, undated [ONLINE] 
http://ideas.repec.org/p/wiw/wiwrsa/ersa02p053.html [accessed April 15, 2005]; A. Kuncoro, 
“Corruption and Economic Growth in Indonesia.” Ekonomi dan Keuangan Indonesia XLX (1), 2002, 79-114; 
A. Kuncoro, Bribery at the Local Government Level in Indonesia: A Preliminary Descriptive Analysis. Jakarta, 
2003;  A. Kuncoro and J.V. Henderson, Corruption in Indonesia [NBER Working Paper], 2004 [ONLINE]  
http://www.nber.org/papers/w10674.pdf [accessed January 11, 2005].  
corruption activities in a country, a province or a district.26  Current corruption 
research is thus trying to develop more reliable indicators for corruption-related 
risks.  Infrastructure projects have been proven to be an interesting 
“playground” for such research endeavours in the past.  The World Bank’s 
transport projects provide thus an ideal opportunity to gain a more systematic 
understanding of corruption-related risks in such projects.  Against this 
backdrop, the WBOJ should try to establish a “corruption map” across 
Indonesian districts that would become the reference point for an efficient and 
effective anti-corruption strategy in transport projects in the future.  Indicators 
for differences between districts with regard to corruption could be derived by 
comparing the difference in the physical quantities of public infrastructure as 
established in World Bank transport projects to the cumulative price the World 
Bank pays for projects.  A large difference between the existing physical 
infrastructure and the funds spent would indicate that much money is siphoned 
off to fraud, bribes and kickbacks, i.e. corruption.  Inter-district comparison 
based on such methods has recently been carried out in other countries and has 
proven that the forms and extent of corruption differ to a large degree between 
sub-national units, i.e. provinces and districts.27  Such a “corruption map” would 
allow identification of the forms and extent of corruption across Indonesian 
districts more systematically. 
 
a) Medium-term Actions 
 
  There was no NGO supervision during the implementation phase of EIRTP-I, 
despite the PAD foreseeing such an eventuality.  This was corrected to some 
extent during EIRTP-II with the introduction of the CRO scheme (which brought 
in members of the public, not NGOs) described above.  However, the 
contribution of this scheme to anti-corruption monitoring is still questioned 
within the World Bank and a revision is currently underway.  Perhaps the 
contribution of community oversight initiatives to anti-corruption efforts should 
be evaluated more fundamentally.  Given that the results of community 
oversight of anti-corruption efforts have been mixed at best,28 the World Bank 
should assess whether funds spent for such community oversight initiatives 
would not be more efficiently used if they would be spent to increase the number 
of Bank-supervised audits instead.  However, as the World Bank most likely will 
have to commit to a policy in which community oversight plays an important 
role due to support for this strategy in various sectors, Bank-community 
                                                     
26 For an excellent analysis of the weaknesses of perception-based corruption indices, please see F. 
Galtung, Measuring the Immeasurable: Boundaries and Functions of (Macro) Corruption Indices, TIRI, 2005 
[ONLINE]  http://www.tiri.org/metrics-indicators.html [accessed February 2, 2005].  
27 Please see Golden and Picci, “Proposal for a New Measure of Corruption, Illustrated with Italian Data,” 
Economics and Politics, Vol. 17, No. 1, 2005, 37-75. 
28 Please see again B. Olken, “Monitoring Corruption: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Indonesia” 
2004 [ONLINE] http://www.imf.org/external/np/res/seminars/2005/weak/bo.pdf [accessed October 
7, 2005].  Two other interviewees also questioned the contribution of community oversight initiatives to 
anti-corruption monitoring.  
interaction mechanisms should be revised to make community supervision a 
more effective anti-corruption monitoring tool.29  In past projects, community 
supervision has yielded positive results regarding anti-corruption monitoring 
when NGOs (another form of popular involvement in project monitoring) could 
report corruption-related incidents directly to World Bank staff rather than the 
GoI, as for example in the Kecamatan Development Project (KDP).30 This is 
currently not the case in EIRTP-I and EIRTP-II. 
 
2.  Follow-up systems have to be improved.  Corruption can only be contained if it is reported. 
Successful anti-corruption mechanisms thus encourage and enable people to report corruption-
related incidents.  Furthermore, no anti-corruption mechanism can fully succeed unless there is 
a real possibility of prosecution.  A solid follow-up system for corruption complaints has thus to 
reach out in two directions: one, it has to encourage people to report corruption, and two, it has 
to process such complaints in a fast and effective manner; this will be important both for 
prosecution of corruption-related incidents as well as to avoid discouragement among 
whistleblowers.  
 
 Immediate Action 
   
 Mechanisms have to be put in place that encourage people to report corruption. 
The World Bank should adhere to its dissemination of information policy 
outlined in the EIRTP PAD.  This strategy could include the possibility of 
reporting corruption-related incidents via the project website.  A tracking system 
could be established in the context of such a system.  Once the complaint is filed, 
the whistleblower would be issued with an electronic password and a 
“corruption-complaints number,” which would allow tracking of the status and 
outcome of the complaint within the World Bank.  Such a system would also 
help the World Bank to gain insights about the working mechanisms of its own 
follow-up system.  With an internet penetration of only about 7% of the 
Indonesian population, a solid complaints monitoring system, however, has to 
establish other means, such as phone lines or a complaints post office box, to 
ensure that community members not yet wired to the Internet are also able to 
make their voices heard.  
 
 Whistle-blowing structures within the World Bank have to be improved as well. 
Currently, there is no real incentive for TTLs to draw attention to corruption 
risks in their project as is exemplified by the fact that if a project receives an 
                                                     
29 A follow-up study to find ways to improve NGO participation in World Bank project oversight is 
proposed as part of this report. See Appendix G for a draft terms of reference. 
30 Please see Andrea Woodhouse, “Village Corruption in Indonesia: Fighting Corruption in the World 
Bank’s Kecamatan Development Program,” 2002 [ONLINE] 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTINDONESIA/Resources/Social/Village+Corruption+in+Indon
esia.pdf [accessed October 7, 2005]. 
unsatisfactory rating (because of corruption or other factors) it may be put on 
hold; this is not in the career interest of a TTL. 
 
Medium-term Action 
 
 As was mentioned above, a solid follow-up system does not only have to 
improve mechanisms for whistleblowers but also has to ensure that 
complaints are handled in an efficient way.  Until today, a lot of frustration 
seems to originate in the inertia of the GoI to follow up on complaints that are 
reported to it through the World Bank.31  An obvious action to tackle this 
problem would be to replace the current monitoring and follow-up system 
carried out by the GoI with a World Bank monitoring system.    
 
 The World Bank should refine its blacklisting procedure.  Above all, 
blacklisted companies should be mentioned on the project’s website and also 
disseminated via other channels mentioned above.32    
 
                                                     
31 This is still a problem in EIRTP-II: “The lack of movement from the PMU to fulfill its commitment to 
independent, objective, third party monitoring is the most serious cause for concern in relation to the 
implementation of EIRTP-II’s Anti-Corruption Action Plan.” In Anti-Corruption Action Plan Review: Second 
Eastern Indonesia Regional Transport Project,  September 13, 2005 [unpublished World Bank document].  
32 Please see the project’s website which does not show such information. Available from: 
http://web.worldbank.org/external/default/main?menuPK=287104&pagePK=141143&piPK=141103&t
heSitePK=226309  [accessed October 7, 2005].  
Summary of Indicators 
 
Red-Flags 
 
 Proximity of proposed costs to the bid estimate  
Validity and Reliability of Indicator: I think this would be a “good” red flag 
according to our spectrum. An increase in  variance between proposed costs 
and the bid estimate would show that  collusion is going down.  
Implementation: Establish a data base on the discrepancy between proposed 
costs and the bid estimate over time. 
Costs: No clue, I am sorry.  
 
 Proximity of project costs across bidders 
Validity and Reliability of Indicator: I think this would be a “good” red flag 
according to our spectrum. An increase in variance between project costs 
proposed by bidders would show that collusion is going down.  
Implementation: Establish a data base on the proximity of costs across 
bidders over time. 
Cost: Dito 
 
 Variance in companies which are winning bids 
Validity and Reliability of Indicator: I think this would be a “good” red flag 
according to our spectrum. An increase in variance in the companies that are 
winning bids shows that the risk for collusion has been curbed. 
Implementation: Establish a data base with company facts and analyse the 
bidding companies over time. 
Cost: Dito  
 
 Accuracy of bidding documents i.e. inaccurate documents that contain rounded 
numbers would be an indication for corruption  
Validity and Reliability of Indicator: I think this would be a “good” red flag 
according to our spectrum. An increase in accuracy of the bidding documents 
shows that the risk of handing in documents with rounded numbers has 
become too high.  
Implementation: Establish a data base with information on the data that 
submitted in the bidding documents. Comparison over time will allow you to 
evaluate the change in accuracy of bidding documents. 
Costs: Dito 
 
 Number of bidders in a given project 
Validity and Reliability of Indicator: I think this would be a “good” red  
flag according to our spectrum. An increase in number of bidders shows that 
competition has been increased, thus the likelihood for KKN has been 
reduced.  
Implementation: Establish a data base on number of bidders and compare 
over time.  
Costs: Dito 
  Reduction of project costs 
Validity and Reliability of Indicator: I think this would be an “average” red 
flag according to our spectrum. Reduction of project costs might occur due to 
other reasons than a reduction in corruption e.g. experience, improvement of 
logistics etc. However, if very similar projects in similar settings are 
compared, then this indicator would probably allow to make a meaningful 
statement about corruption. 
Implementation: Establish a data base on project costs and compare projects 
over time and district. 
Costs: Dito 
 
 Large differences in the quality of bidding documents 
Validity and Reliability of Indicator:  I think this would be an “average” or 
“bad” red flag according to our spectrum. Differences in the quality of 
bidding documents could be due to all sorts of reasons e.g. experience of a 
company, quality of the staff of a company, facilities of a company etc. 
Implementation: Establish a database on the quality of bidding documents 
submitted. Compare both within and between companies over time.  
Costs: Dito 
 
 Anomalies during the bidding process e.g. withdrawal of bidders at the last 
minute 
Validity and Reliability of Indicator: I think this would be an “average” or 
“bad” red flag according to our spectrum. There might be anomalies in the 
bidding process for all sorts of reasons e.g. companies go bankrupt, they 
might secure a more lucrative contract and thus withdraw from the bidding 
etc. 
Implementation: Establish a data base and record anomalies during bidding 
processes. If there is a district or a project where similar anomalies are 
occurring repeatedly, this might be an indication for corruption. Compare 
over time. 
Costs: Dito 
 
 Comparing the difference in the physical quantities of public infrastructure as 
established in World Bank transport projects to the cumulative price the World Bank 
pays for projects.   
Validity and Reliability of Indicator:  I think this would be a “good” red flag 
according to our spectrum. Of course, you would have to weight the 
discrepancy against labour costs of a region, a district etc. (The stuff we 
discussed yesterday) to say something meaningful. 
Implementation: Spot checks would have to be conducted in roads, bridges 
etc. of the EIRTP-I. It is up to experts involved in this project e.g. engineers to 
decide what kind of infrastructure would have to be checked in order to come 
up with an adequate picture of how much money might be lost due to 
corruption. 
Costs: Dito  
 
 
Systemic indicators 
 
 Number of training programs  
Validity and Reliability of Indicator:  I think this would be a “good” 
systemic indicator according to our spectrum. The number of training 
programs held tell you something about the work of the ACI. 
Implementation: Establish a database on number of training programs and  
compare over time and projects. 
Costs: Dito 
 
 Certification processes for all bid and procurement committees (binary) 
Validity and Reliability of Indicator: I think this would be a “good” 
systemic indicator according to our spectrum. Whether bid and procurement 
committees have to go through a certification process or not tells you 
something about the anti-corruption work of the Bank. 
Implemantion: Establish a data base with the required data and compare 
over time and project. 
Costs: Dito 
 
 Degree of disclosure of project information  
Validity and Reliability of Indicator:  I think this would be a “good” 
systemic indicator according to our spectrum. We have discussed the reasons 
why. 
Implementation: Establish a data base which allows you to compare the 
number of document pages on the web, in the library, disseminated to the 
public with the number of document pages that are actually produced.  
Costs: Dito 
 
 Reduction of procurement delays 
Validity and Reliability of Indicator: I think this would be an “average” 
systemic indicator to measure anti-corruption monitoring efforts. More 
efficient procurement processes might result because of other reasons.  
Implementation: Establish a data base on the average time a procurement 
process takes. Then measure deviations from this average time. Compare 
over time and project.  
Costs: Dito 
 
 Accuracy of data on bidding companies 
Validity and Reliability of Indicator:  I think this would be a “good” 
systemic indicator. More accurate data shows that the system is working 
better.  
Implementation: Define a minimum standard of company information 
required. Then establish a data base on the deviation of a project’s company 
information. Compare over time and project.  
Costs: Dito 
  Number of blacklisted companies per project 
Validity and Reliability of Indicator:  I think this would be an “average” 
systemic indicator. Increasing numbers of blacklisted companies would only 
allow to say something about the “improvement” of the WB’s anti-corruption 
monitoring if the number of corrupt companies out there would be constant. 
Since this is not the case, this indicator is biased.  
Implementation: Establish a data base with the number of blacklisted  
companies. Compare over time and project. 
Costs: Dito 
 
 Number of audits conducted per project 
Validity and Reliability of Indicator:  I think this would be a “good” 
systemic indicator to measure WB’s anti-corruption efforts.  
Implementation: Establish a data base with the number of audits conducted 
in a project per year. Compare over time and project. 
Costs: Dito 
 
 Number of foreign supervisors per project 
Validity and Reliability of Indicator: Against the backdrop that the Senior 
Project Engineer of  EIRTP-I considered foreign supervision to have a 
considerable impact on corruption related risks, the appointment of more 
foreign supervisors would be an indication of the WB to curb corruption 
(WATCH OUT: NOT a red flag to measure if corruption is actually curbed). 
Implementation: Establish a data base and count the number of foreign 
supervisors per project. Compare over time and project. 
Costs: Dito 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
